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ACTS BARRING PROPERTY RIGHTS
W. BRYAN BoLIci*
The subject matter of this article is the North Carolina statute
bearing this title which became operative as of October 1, 1961, and
is contained in new chapter 31A of the General Statutes. This
statute bars or modifies the benefits of certain types of property rights
and interests otherwise accruing to one person by virtue of the death
of another person against whom he has committed a specified type
of wrong. Article 1 deals with marital property rights between
husband and wife; article 2 covers parental rights as to the estate of
a child; and article 3 is concerned with selected types of property or
contract benefits otherwise accruing or resulting from a victim to one
who has wilfully and unlawfully killed him. The first two articles
in the main merely restate in one place the content of previously
existing statutes with a few additions and modifications, some of
which were necessitated by the Intestate Succession Act. Article 3
is new and is an attempt to govern by one general statute the suc-
cession or accrual of a number of important property rights or in-
terests from a decedent to his slayer as defined by this chapter.
This commentary is organized by articles, and by way of introduction
to the content of each article there is some discussion of its back-
ground of common law and statutory precedent.
ARTICLE 1-HUSBAND AND WIFE
I. General Common Law
The marriage relation occupies a favored position in American
society. It is generally felt that society should nurture this relation
and protect it.1 The value of this relationship has been implemented
in part by conferring on husband and wife certain property rights or
interests such as dower and curtesy and the right to administer on
the other spouse's estate, which are dependent on the continuation of
the marriage. When the marriage is terminated by an absolute
divorce2 or declared void ab initio by a marriage annulment3 the gen-
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
'Cf. cases cited in 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1 n.26 (1948).
'2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 96 (1932) [hereinafter cited as
VERNIER]; 26 Am. Ju,. Husband and Wife § 116 n.6 (1940).
'26 Am. JUR. Husband and Wife § 116 (1940).
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eral rule is, in absence of a contrary statute, that the contingent
marital property rights perish. Some courts have even held that a
foreign divorce not valid under the laws of the state having juris-
diction over the decedent's spouse's estate will bar the spouse who
obtained the divorce from his or her contingent marital rights in the
estate of the decedent spouse.'
The cases are not harmonious, however, as to whether violations
of marital obligations by a spouse will result in a forfeiture of the
offending spouse's rights or interests in the estate of a decedent
spouse in the absence of statute. Some American jurisdictions
hold that where a wife leaves her husband and lives in adultery and
this act is not condoned, her right to dower is barred. These juris-
dictions have reached this result by holding that the Statute of
Westminster II,' which contained a provision barring a wife who
elopes, was a part of the common law of the jurisdiction. Other
American jurisdictions, however, have refused to follow the Statute
of Westminster and do not bar a wife who is living in adultery at her
husband's death.' A husband who separates from his wife and
commits adultery which is not condoned is generally not barred from
his contingent marital property rights in the absence of statute.8
Furthermore, neither husband nor wife is barred from his or her
intestate share in the deceased spouse's personal property.'
Where a spouse wilfully and without just cause abandons the
other spouse and is not living with the other spouse at the time of
his or her death the courts generally hold, in the absence of statute,
that the offending spouse does not forfeit his or her contingent mari-
tal property rights.' Some courts have held, however, even in the
absence of statute, that a deserting spouse loses the right to home-
stead.' Where the separation of the spouses has resulted from a
bed and board divorce obtained by one spouse, the general common
law rule is that the offending spouse does not lose his or her con-
tingent marital property rights.'
'See, e.g., Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173 N.Y. 503, 66 N.E. 193 (1903);
Monroe County Say. Bank v. Yeoman, 119 Misc. 226, 195 N.Y. Supp. 531
(Sup. Ct. 1922).
ATKINSON, WILLS § 37, at 148 n.5 (1953) [hereinafter cited as ATKIN-
SON].
' 1285, 13 Edw. 1., c. 34. ATKINSON § 37, at 150.
8 Id. at 149. 'Id. at 150. "Old. at 149.
"
1See, e.g., Dickman v. Birkhauser, 16 Neb. 686, 21 N.W. 396 (1884);
Newland v. Holland, 45 Tex. 588 (1876).
"2 VERNIER § 127.
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The cases are not in accord as to the effect of a subsequent
bigamous marriage on the contingent marital property rights or
interests of the offending spouse in the estate of his or her lawful
spouse. Some courts have held that the bigamous marriage, if
knowingly contracted, results in a forfeiture of the contingent marital
property rights of the guilty spouse in the estate of the lawful
spouse.13 In reaching this result some of the cases have relied on the
dubious doctrine that the suriving spouse is estopped to assert his
or her right of inheritance or marital property interest. 4 Other
courts have refused to bar a surviving spouse who has knowingly
contracted a bigamous marriage. 5 If the surviving spouse has inno-
cently contracted a bigamous marriage he or she is generally not
barred. 6
In conclusion, it is seen that generally, in the absence of statute,
an absolute divorce or a marriage annulment destroys contingent
marital property rights or interests. The effect of violations of
marital obligations on contingent marital property rights or interests'
is varied, depending on the jurisdiction and the type of misconduct
involved.
II. General Statutory Solutions
State statutes which change the common law rules concerning
the effect of an absolute divorce on the marital property rights or
interests of spouses in each other's estate, which depend on a contin-
uation of the marriage, are varied and fragmentary. Many statutes
provide that the courts shall have broad discretion in disposing of
the property held by spouses. In exercising this discretion the
courts take into account the guilt or innocence of the spouses and
the relative needs of husband, wife and children.' 7 Some statutes
penalize a guilty wife or husband by preserving either dower or
curtesy to the innocent spouse.' Generally, however, contingent
marital property rights or interests are governed by statutes giving'
the courts, upon divorce, discretion in disposing of the property of
husband and wife.' 9
" See, e.g., Moore v. Robinson, 139 S.C. 393, 137 S.E. 697 (1927);
Darough v. Davis, 135 Okla. 263, 275 Pac. 309 (1929), discussed in Note, 43
HARV. L. REV. 140 (1929).
" ATKINSON § 37, at 151.
15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.
' 2 VERNIER § 96, at 216.
18 See summary of statutes in id. at §§ 97, 99.
'° Id. at 216.
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The effect of an invalid foreign divorce on the contingent marital
property rights of the spouse who obtained the divorce is generally
not covered by statute. One statute, however, which has a provision
similar to that of the new North Carolina statute, is found in New
York.20
The common law rules relating to the effect of a bed and board
divorce on the contingent marital property rights of the offending
spouse have been changed by statute in only a small number of
jurisdictions. A few statutes penalize the offending spouse. A
handful of statutes treat the matter the same as in the case of an
absolute divorce. Generally, however, the common law rules are in
effect.2
Statutes in some twenty-four jurisdictions affect in various ways
the contingent marital property rights of a wife who has committed
serious violations of marital obligations. Forfeiture of dower and
of other contingent marital property rights is imposed for various
kinds of misconduct. Adultery and desertion are the most common
violations of the marital obligations penalized.22
A husband who is guilty of serious misconduct is barred from
his contingent marital property rights in sixteen jurisdictions in
addition to North Carolina. Adultery and desertion, as in the case
of the wife, are the types of violations of marital obligations which
most frequently bar a guilty husband. 3
III. North Carolina Statutes and Cases
Statutes in existence prior to this act provided that an absolute
divorce destroyed the following contingent marital property rights
or interests of husband and wife: (1) right to administer on each
other's estate; (2) right to a distributive share in the personal prop-
erty of the decedent spouse; (3) every right and estate in the per-
sonal estate of the other; (4) dower; (5) curtesy; and (6) every
right and estate in the real or personal estate of the other party,
which by settlement before or after marriage was settled upon such
party in consideration of the marriage only. 4  Number six was
probably initially included because prior to the constitution of 1868
"N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 87(b).
" See summary of statutes in 2 VERNIER §§ 129, 130.2 See statutes summarized in 3 id. at § 202.
2
3Id. at §221.
2
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-10, 52-19 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch.
193, § 42, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1889, ch. 499; N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-
72, ch. 193, § 42].
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marriage settlements were common.25 Since marriage settlements
still occur, the provision forfeiting property rights which were
acquired in consideration of marriage only is not anachronistic.
These prior statutes were in accord with the general common
law rule that an absolute divorce destroys contingent marital prop-
erty rights. These acts, however, were contrary to statutes found in
many states which either preserved some such rights or interest
for the innocent spouse or gave the court discretion in disposing of
the property of husband and wife. The prior statutes did not men-
tion annulment. And although the court in Taylor v. White2 6
stated that on annulment the property rights of both parties were
restored as if there had been no marriage, this statement was
dictum and therefore the effect of an annulment on contingent
marital property rights prior to this act was not authoritatively
determined.
Provision was made, however, in the prior statutes as to the
effect of a divorce from bed and board.17  The offending spouse
was on application deprived of the six designated property rights
previously mentioned. During the separation the innocent party
could convey his or her property freely and thus bar the offending
spouse.
Where husband or wife separated from the other and lived in
adultery which was not condoned, he or she lost the six designated
marital property rights.2 The same result followed when a husband
or wife abandoned the other and was not living with the other at
his or her death.2" It was held in High v. Bailey30 that refusing to
feed a wife and thereby forcing her to leave was tantamount to
21 MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES 300 (2d ed. 1916).
160 N.C. 38, 41, 75 S.E. 941, 943 (1912) (dictum).22N.C. GENa. STAT. §§ 28-12, 52-20 to -21 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-
72, ch. 193, § 45; N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 44, as amended, N.C.
Pub. Laws 1893, ch. 153, §§ 1-3; N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 45, as
amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1893, ch. 153, § 4].
28 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-11 to -12, 52-20 to -21 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws
1871-72, ch. 193, § 44; N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 45; N.C. Pub.
Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 44, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1893, ch. 153,
§ 1-3; N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 45, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws
1893, ch. 153, § 4].2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-12, 52-20 to -21 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-
72, ch. 193, § 45; N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 44, as amended, N.C.
Pub. Laws 1893, ch. 153, §§ 1-3; N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 45, as
amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1893, ch. 153, § 4].
" 107 N.C. 70, 12 S.E. 45 (1890).
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abandonment. During a period of abandonment or before an elope-
ment had been condoned, the innocent party was free to convey his
or her property and thereby bar the offending spouse.
The prior statutes did not cover the effect of contracting a
bigamous marriage on the marital property rights of the guilty
spouse, and there seems to be no North Carolina case on point. Of
course, if a spouse voluntarily separated from the other spouse and
lived in adultery via a bigamous marriage, other provisions would
bar the guilty spouse.
Finally, the prior statutes did not determine the effect of an
invalid foreign divorce on the marital property rights of the offending
spouse. And although it was held in Arrington v. Arringtonal that
a valid foreign divorce would terminate certain marital property
rights, there seems to be no case dealing with the effect of a divorce
not valid in North Carolina on the marital property rights of the
spouse who obtained the divorce.
In conclusion the statutes in effect prior to this act provided for
a forfeiture of certain designated marital property rights in the
event of divorce or serious violations of marital obligations.
IV. North Carolina Statute, 1961, Provisions Barring Husband
and Wife
§ 31A-1 (a) The following persons shall lose the rights specified
in subsection (b) of this section: (1) A spouse from whom or by
whom an absolute divorce or marriage annulment has been obtained
or from whom a divorce from bed and board has been obtained; or
(2) A spouse who voluntarily separates from the other spouse and
lives in adultery and such has not been condoned; or (3) A spouse
who wilfully and without just cause abandons and refuses to live with
the other spouse and is not living with the other spouse at the time of
such spouse's death; or (4) A spouse who obtains a divorce the validity
of which is not recognized under the laws of this State; or (5) A
spouse who knowingly contracts a bigamous marriage.
(b) The rights lost as specified in subsection (a) of this section
shall be as follows: (1) All rights of intestate succession in the estate
of the other spouse; (2) All right to claim or succeed to a homestead
in the real property of the other spouse; (3) All right to dissent from
the will of the other spouse and take either the intestate share pro-
vided or the life interest in lieu thereof; (4) All right to any year's
" 102 N.C. 491, 9 S.E. 200 (1889).
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allowance in the personal property of the other spouse; (5) All right
to administer the estate of the other spouse; and (6) Any rights or
interests in the property of the other spouse which by a settlement
before or after marriage were settled upon the offending spouse solely
in consideration of the marriage.
(c) Any act specified in subsection (a) of this section may be
pleaded in bar of any action or proceeding for the recovery of such
rights, interests or estate as set forth in subsection (b) of this section.
(d) The spouse not at fault may sell and convey his or her real
and personal property as if such person were unmarried, and thereby
bar the other spouse of all right, title and interest therein in the
following instances: (1) During the continuance of a separation
arising from a divorce from bed and board as specified in subsection
(a) (1) of this section, or (2) During the continuance of a separa-
tion arising from adultery as specified in subsection (a) (2) of this
section, or during the continuance of a separation arising from an
abandonment as specified in subsection (a) (3) of this section, or
(3) When a divorce is granted as specified in subsection (a) (4) of
this section, or a bigamous marriage contracted as specified in sub-
section (a) (5) of this section.
This section accomplishes three major purposes. First, it col-
lects in one statute the various statutory provisions which bar a
spouse, because of divorce or by virtue of certain misconduct, from
participation in the administration or settlement of the other spouse's
estate.
A second effect of the statute is its modification of the prior
statutory provisions necessitated by the Intestate Succession Act.
G.S. § 52-19, for example, provided that an absolute divorce termi-
nated the rights of curtesy and dower in each spouse's estate. This
act, however, abolishes curtesy and dower and substitutes different
provisions for surviving spouses which this section takes into account
in its listing of rights or interests forfeited by divorce or misconduct.
Finally, this section clarifies the effect on designated contingent
marital property rights of certain situations not expressly determined
under prior statutes or cases. One such question is the effect of a
marriage annulment on the designated contingent marital property
rights of husband and wife. This section provides that an annul-
ment has the same effect on such property rights as an absolute
divorce. Since an annulment terminates a marriage, it follows that
marital property rights or interests dependent on a continuation of
1962]
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the marriage should also be terminated. As stated previously, the
general American common law rule is to this effect.
Another moot question was the effect of an unrecognized
foreign divorce on the contingent marital property rights of the
spouse who obtained the divorce. This section forfeits such rights.
This provision is supported by sound policy reasons protecting
marriage as an important social institution. This provision says
in effect that if a spouse gets so "Reno-vated" he or she shall forfeit
the specified rights or interests.
A third contingency not explicitly covered under former law was
the effect on the contingent marital property rights or interests of
a spouse who knowingly contracted a bigamous marriage. This
section provides for their forfeiture in such case. It is true that
under the former statutes a spouse who voluntarily separated from
the other spouse and committed adultery was barred from certain
contingent marital property rights and therefore, in most cases, a
spouse who knowingly contracted a bigamous marriage would be
barred by that provision. The new statutory provision, therefore,
does increase the number of possible acts resulting in forfeiture.
More important, however, is its effect in excluding, by implication,
such forfeiture from the innocent contracting of a bigamous mar-
riage. A spouse who believes the other spouse to be dead or validly
divorced is not morally blameworthy when he or she marries again.
Subsection (c) of this section provides that a spouse may freely
convey his or her property and thereby bar the other spouse during
the designated periods. These provisions are the same as those
under the former statutes with the addition of a provision for big-
amous marriage and a provision for divorces not recognized under
the laws of North Carolina.
In conclusion, the above section brings together in one statute all
legislation which bars husband and wife from contingent marital
property rights as a result of divorce or violations of marital obliga-
tions, modifies former statutory provisions to conform with the
Intestate Succession Act, and makes a few additions to the prior
statutes.
ARTICLE Z-PARENT AND CHILD
I. Common Law
The exclusion in English law of parents as heirs of deceased
children dates back to the middle of the twelfth century.8 2 Bracton
" 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISE LAW 294 (2d ed.
1923).
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explained this result by using a metaphor: an inheritance is a heavy
body which can only "descend" and therefore cannot fall upwards
to ancestors.33  This of course is no explanation. Powell has sug-
gested that the rule had the practical purpose of removing unneces-
sary risks of death to offspring.34 Whatever the explanation, the
rule disappeared in the United States before 1825." 5 Moreover,
since the English Statute of Distribution, 1670, parents take per-
sonal property as next of kin.3
The question of whether abandonment of a child by a parent will
bar the parent from taking under the intestate succession laws of the
state has seldom come before the courts. Two courts facing the
question, however, have held that when the intestate laws make no
exception for abandonment, none will be implied. 7 Since inherit-
ance is covered by statutes in all jurisdictions, there is no formulated
body of common law covering the question of whether abandonment
will bar a parent."
11. General Statutory Solutions
Despite the fact that it is highly inequitable to allow a parent
who has abandoned the care and maintenance of a child to inherit
from the deceased child, only a few states have passed statutes bar-
ring the parent. 9 One statute, similar to the new act's provision
barring parents, is found in New York.4" Section 87(e) of the New
York statute provides in part that:
No distributive share of the estate of a decedent shall be
allowed . . . in the estate of a child to a parent who has
neglected or refused to provide for such child during infancy
or who has abandoned such child during infancy whether or
not such child dies during infancy, unless the parental rela-
83Id. at 286.
4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 632 n.25 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
POWELL].
'RId. at 632.
ATKINSON § 17.
"It re Green's Estate, 197 Iowa 1169, 196 N.W. 993 (1924), discussed
in Note, 10 VA. L. REv. 650 (1924); Avery v. Brantley, 191 N.C. 396, 131
S.E. 721 (1926), discussed in Note, 5 N.C.L. REv. 72 (1926).
8 4 VERNIER § 239.8 0ATXINSON § 37, at 148. Statutes concerning a parent's right to inherit
from a deceased child are summarized in 4 VERNIER § 239.
, N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §§ 87(e), 133-4(c).
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tionship and duties are subsequently resumed and continue
until the death of the child.
One question presented by the above statutory provision is when
must a parent resume his obligations? It was held in Matter of
Daniel's Estate4' that a parent is given a reasonable time within
which to re-establish broken family relations and obligations. It will
be seen that the new act makes explicit the time allowed a parent to
make amends.
III. North Carolina Statutes and Cases
In Avery v. Brantley42 it was decided that the intestacy law did
not bar a parent who had abandoned his child from participating
in the child's estate. In response to this decision the legislature pro-
vided that:
If, in the lifetime of its father and mother, a child dies in-
testate, without leaving husband, wife or child, or the issue of
a child, its estate shall be equally divided between the father
and mother.... Provided, that a parent, or parents, who has
willfully abandoned the care, custody, nurture and main-
tenance of such child to its kindred, relatives or other person,
shall forfeit all and every right to participate in any part of
said child's estate under the provisions of this section.4"
The above statutory provision corrects an inequitable situation
and expresses the policy that North Carolina has since adhered to,
although few other states bar a parent who has neglected his or her
parental obligations.
IV. The North Carolina Statute, 1961, Barring Parents
§ 31A-2. Any parent who has wilfully abandoned the care and
maintenance of his or her child shall lose all right to intestate suc-
cession in any part of the child's estate and all right to administer
the estate of the child, except (1) Where the abandoning parent
resumed its care and maintenance at least one year prior to the death
"193 Misc. 862, 83 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
191 N.C. 396, 131 S.E. 721 (1926).
'
3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-149(6) (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws, ch. 231
(1927)].
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of the child and continued the same until its death; or (2) Where a
parent has been deprived of the custody of his or her child under an
order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent has sub-
stantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribu-
tion to the support of the child.
By the new Interstate Succession Act, G.S. § 28-149(6) was re-
pealed. The above statutory provision was enacted to revise, broaden
and reintroduce G.S. § 28-149(6).
This section reflects substantially the policy considerations of
the former law and introduces some modifications. It provides that
if the abandoning parent was deprived of custody by court order and
the parent substantially complied with the order of the court re-
quiring contribution to the support of the child, such parent may
participate in the distribution of the estate. Moreover, if a parent
who abandons his child resumes care and maintenance at least one
year prior to the death of the child and continues the same until
its death, he or she is not barred.
These modifications are worthwhile. It seems desirable to per-
mit a parent deprived of custody of his or her child to participate
in the child's estate if the parent has supported the child. Moreover,
such a provision should encourage child care. An abandoning parent
might also be induced to resume care of his or her child by the one-
year provision. It seems desirable to encourage abandoning parents
to make amends.
Finally, it should be noted that the new law specifies with reason-
able certainty the conditions under which an abandoning parent may
regain expectant rights or interests in his or her child's estate.
ARTICLE 3-SLAYER AND DECEDENT
I. General Common Law
When a person has been wilfully and unlawfully killed by his
heir, his spouse, his legatee or devisee, his cotenant or insurance
beneficiary, it is shocking for the law to permit such a slayer to ac-
quire the decedent's property as a result of his death; and the
age-old maxim of our common law that one should not be permitted
to profit by his own wrong seems particularly applicable in case of
such a heinous crime. 4 However, in the absence of a statutory
"See Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of Problem in Anglo-Ameri-
can Law, 19 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 229 (1942).
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provision barring such a criminal the majority of courts have ruled
that he may not be so deprived of his ill-gotten gain.4" These cases
reason that statutes of intestate succession and of wills are exclusive
and when they do not contain such an exception the courts should
not legislate by implying one, while some mention constitutional or
statutory provisions forbidding forfeiture for crime.4" However,
the legal trend, legislative and judicial, is to prevent the slayer from
profiting by his own wrong. On the basis of public policy and in
the light of common law principles some cases deny any title to the
slayer by judicially writing such an exception into the wills and in-
testacy statutes by way of statutory interpretation.47 More recent
decisions preserve the property for the decedent's estate through the
equitable device of impressing a constructive trust upon the legal title
in the hands of the killer, the now generally approved nonstatutory
method.4" And though their details vary greatly, considerably more
than half of the states have enacted statutes on the subject, which bar
"Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Conn. 491, 95 A.2d 71 (1953) ; Crumley v. Hall,
202 Ga. 588, 43 S.E.2d 646 (1947), discussed in Note, 26 N.C.L. Rnv. 232
(1948); Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); McAllister
v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky.
793, 185 S.W. 487 (1916); Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971
(1939); Wychoff v. Clark, 77 Pa. D. & C. 249 (C.P. of Luzerne County
1951). See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 477 (1955).
"' No statutory exception: Wall v. Pfanschmidt, stpra note 45; McAllister
v. Fair, supra note 45; In re Duncan's Estate, 40 Wash. 2d 850, 246 P.2d 445
(1952). Constitutional provision: Crumley v. Hall, supra note 45; Owens
v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888). Contra, Weaver v. Hollis,
247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d 525 (1945); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 Atl.
470 (1933); Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W. 239
(1930); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
"' Price v. Hitaffer, supra note 46; Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co., supra
note 46; Perry v. Strawbridge, supra note 46; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y.
506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) ; Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930) ;
Estate of Wilkins, 192 Wis. 111, 211 N.W. 652 (1927); Potter, The Ac-
quisition of Property by Homicide, 38 U. DET. L.J. 360 (1961).
"' Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d 525 (1945); Colton v. Wade,
32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (Ct. Ch. 1951); Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55,
93 A.2d 345 (1952) ; Garner v. Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948) ;
Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927), discussed in Note, 5
N.C.L. Rrv. 373 (1927); Parks v. Dumas, 321 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959); I4 re Wilson's Will, 5 Wis. 2d 178, 92 N.W.2d 282 (1958); BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTES § 478 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT] ;
RESTATEMENT, RF-STITUTION § 187 (1937); 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 492-94 (2d
ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as ScoTT]; Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire
Title by His Crime and Keep It?, 45 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 225 (1897).
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the slayer from acquiring his victim's property which would other-
wise pass to him.
4 9
In the analogous cases of the life insurance beneficiary who un-
lawfully kills the insured, and of the co-owner of survivorship prop-
erty who so slays his co-owner, statutes and insurance law always
deprive the insurance beneficiary;5" but as to co-owned property
similar conflicting common law rules exist as in the wills and in-
heritance cases, with little statutory intervention.5 1
The principle of survivorship by homicide which actually creates
or enlarges a property interest in the killer at the expense of his
victim seems indefensible. In all of these cases, if the decedent had
not been killed he might have outlived the slayer who thereby
acquires property which but for the killing he might never have
acquired. It seems but right to prevent such unjust enrichment
by resolving all doubts against the slayer, under the assumption
that the decedent survived, and thereby give the property to those
persons who would have taken it if the slayer had predeceased his
victim instead of allowing him to assure his own survival of the
decedent by the killing which wrongfully deprives the decedent of his
right of survivorship and partition in joint tenancy.52 And except
' ATKINSON § 37; BOGERT § 478; 4 POWELL 597; 4 SCOTT §§ 492-94;
Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (pt. 3), 14 IowA L. REv. 283, 304-05 (1928) ;
Rees, American Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 888-89 (1960);
Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory
Solution, 49 HARV. L. Ruv. 715 (1936); Note, Disposition of Property Held
in Joint Tenancy When One Cotenant Causes the Death of the Other, 41
MINN. L. REv. 639, 645 (1957).
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Mich.
1941); Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Linson, 245 Ala. 493, 17 So. 2d 761(1944); Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816
(1923); Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67
S.E.2d 71 (1951), discussed in Note, 30 N.C.L. Rxv. 175 (1952); see Annot,
26 A.L.R.2d 987 (1952); 4 Scofr § 494.1; VANCE, INSURANCE § 117 (3d ed.
1951).
5 BOGERT § 478; 4 SCOTT § 493.2; Weiner, Felonious Homicide and the
Right of Survivorship Under Tenancy by the Entireties, 17 MD. L. REV. 45(1957); Note, Acquisition of Property by the Murder of a Cotenant, 37
IowA L. Rv. 582 (1952); Note, 41 MINN. L. Rxv. 639 (1957); Annot.,
32 A.L.R.2d 1099 (1953).
" Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (Ct. Ch. 1951) ; Bradley
v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955); Cowan v. Pleasant, 263
S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954); Diamond v. Ganci, 328 Mass. 315, 103 N.E.2d
716 (1952) ; Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952) ; Grose
v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 21 S.W.2d 464 (1948); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209
Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27
S.W.2d 757 (1930) ; Neiman v. Hurft, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952) ; Van
Alstyne v. Tuffy, 109 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918); AmEs,
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for application of the historical concept of co-ownership that by the
conveyance to them the whole title vests initially in each co-owner
with its consequent fiction that nothing passes by survivorship as a
result of the crime, there should be no taint of unconstitutionality on
the ground of forfeiture for crime or taking property without due
process of law in the cases and statutes which reach this result by
denying him the benefits of survivorship because no property is
taken, from the slayer; he is merely prevented from getting property
by killing someone-a salutary moral principle and crime de-
terrent.53  Even though no new estate technically passes to the
survivor his interest is certainly enlarged since he is now sole owner
of the whole property and need no longer share its income or control
or right of disposition with his cotenant.
II. General Statutory Solutions
There are statutes in most states, many of which have been
enacted expressly to repeal case law favoring wrongdoers, or to
fill the gaps in and eliminate the uncertainties from case law in order
the better to effectuate the sound public policy that one shall not
acquire property through the intentional and unlawful killing of
the owner.54 These statutes are far from uniform and vary in four
principle respects: (1) types of property interests or succession
covered; (2) character of the crime; (3) necessity of conviction;
(4) disposition of the property involved. As to (1), three states,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota,5 have adopted a
complete scheme based upon a proposed model act covering most of
the possibilities whereby a slayer benefits from his victim's death,
including succession by testacy, intestacy, as surviving spouse or life
insurance beneficiary, survivorship in co-ownership and bank ac-
counts, acceleration of a future interest, removal of defeasibilities
LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 321 (1913); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION§ 188, comment a (1937) ; 4 ScoTT § 492.
"' Colton v. Wade, supra note 52; Bradley v. Fox, supra note 52; Hamblin
v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 Pac. 678 (1918) ; Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich.
265, 63 N.W.2d 841 (1954); Perry v. Strawbridge, supra note 52; Barnett
v. Covey, supra note 52; Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188(1889) ; cases and text cited notes 123-26 infra.5
'Authorities cited note 49 supra; Note, Effect Upon a Murderer's Estate
of Statutes Precluding Murderers Inheritance froim Victim, 44 YALE L.J.
164, 166-67 (1934).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-1 to -15 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 2, 1961);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3445-3446 (Supp. 1960); S.D. CODE §§ 56.0501-
.0505 (1939).
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affecting property interests, and exercise or non-exercise of powers.
of appointment or of revocation.56 The largest number of the other
statutes prevent a killer from taking from his victim by testate or
intestate succession, as surviving spouse, or as his life insurance
beneficiary.5" A few of these statutes are wider and also include
interests received by deed or otherwise,5" but only four statutes.
expressly include survivorship in joint ownership. 59
As to (2) a number of the statutes confine the crime to murder,.
but a majority specify a homicide committed feloniously or wilfully
and unlawfully, and most statutes include an accessory or con--
spirator.6 ° As to (3) sixteen of the statutes require a conviction,
while ten do not mention conviction, but specify a killing.61 As to.
(4) most of the statutes treat testate and intestate property alike
by barring the slayer and providing that it shall pass as though he-
had predeceased the decedent, or that testate property shall be dis-
tributed as if the legacy or devise had been revoked; some merely-
disable the slayer from taking without specifying how it shall pass."
These statutes are generally construed strictly on the theory
that they are penal in nature and have been held to apply only to.
conveyances made after a statute's effective date.63 Unless the-
specific property relation, interest or event involved is precisely
covered by the language of the statute it does not apply; for example,
a statute which prohibits a killer from taking the estate of his victirr
by testate or intestate succession or otherwise has been held not to&
prevent a joint tenant who murders his co-tenant from benefitting
by survivorship because technically he takes nothing thereby."4 This.
"' Wade, supra note 49.
"BOGERT § 478; 4 ScoTT § 492.1; Wade, supra note 49, at 888; Note, 41
MINN. L. REv. 639, 646-47 (1957).
BOGERT § 478.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.280 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-5 to -6 (Adv..
Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 2, 1961) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3441 (Supp. 1960) ;
S.D. CODE § 56.0505 (1939); See Note, 41 MINN. L. Rv. 639, 646 (1957).
"0 BOGERT § 478; 4 ScoTT § 493.2; Rees, supra note 49, at 888-89; Note,
41 MINN. L. Rnv. 639, 648-49 (1957).
0" BOGERT § 478; 4 Scorr §§ 492.1-.4; Rees, supra note 49, at 889; Note,.
41 MINN. L. REv. 639, 652 (1957).
BOGERT § 478; Rees, supra note 49, at 890.
Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 Fed. 776 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 255:
U.S. 562 (1920); Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950);
It re Kuhn's Estate, 135 Iowa 449, 101 N.W. 151 (1904); Wychoff v. Clark,
77 Pa. D. & C. 249 (C.P. of Luzerne County 1951); Beddingfield v. Estill,
118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1906); Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 64-
S.E.2d 809 (1951).
" In re Forter's Estate, 182 Kan. 315, 320 P.2d 855 (1958) ; In re King's.
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literal or strict construction of a statute which bars a person who is
"convicted" or "adjudged guilty" of murder permits a murderer to
take his victim's property where his suicide prevents prosecution;5
and conviction of a lesser or different offense than that specified by
the statute will not suffice.6 The result is the same where one kills
in self-defense,6  while insane,6 or is acquitted."° But in these cases
where the statute is technically inapplicable the killer may still be
prevented from benefitting from the property by the utilization of
common law concepts such as the constructive trust, if not deemed
superseded by the statute. 0
III. North Carolina Cases and Statutes
North Carolina has the dubious distinction of having produced
perhaps the first American case on the precise question whether a
murderer could acquire title to the property of his victim by surviving
him. This leading case, Owens v. Owens,"1 sounded the keynote on
the subject when it held that a wife who was convicted of being an
accessory before the fact to her husband's murder could not be denied
dower because it would involve a forfeiture of property for crime,
and that only the legislature could change a statutory right of prop-
Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952). See Blanks v. Jiggetts, supra
note 63.
" Peeples v. Corbett, 117 Fla. 213, 157 So. 510 (1926); Shuman v.
Schick, 95 Ohio App. 413, 120 N.E.2d 530 (1953); Estate of Tarlo, 315 Pa.
321, 172 Atl. 139 (1934) ; Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930).
Contra, Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931) (homicide ad-
mitted in the answer in a civil action).
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Mich.
1941) ; Estate of Kirby, 162 Cal. 191, 121 Pac. 370 (1912) ; Bird v. Plunkett,
139 Conn. 491, 95 A.2d 71 (1953) ; In re Sparks Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15
N.Y.S.2d 926 (Surr. Ct. 1939); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W.
Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934); In re Houghton, [1915] 2 Ch. 173.
" Floyd v. Franklin, 251 Ala. 15, 36 So. 2d 234 (1948) ; Colton v. Wade,
32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (Ct. Ch. 1951).
"SAnderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956); Eisen-
hardt v. Siegel, 343 Mo. 22, 119 S.W.2d 810 (1938), discussed in Note, 37
MicH. L. Rv. 965 (1939); In re Eckhardt's Estate, 184 Misc. 748, 54
N.Y.S.2d 484 (Surr. Ct. 1945); Sobel v. National Bank & Trust Co., 71 Pa.
D. & C. 321 (C.P. of Erie County 1950).
"° Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 Fed. 776 (8th Cir. 1920); Crouse v.
Crouse, 210 Iowa 508, 229 N.W. 850 (1930); Legette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403,
85 S.E.2d 576 (1955), discussed in Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 702 (1955).
1' Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954) ; Anderson v. Grasberg,
247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956); Estate of Tarlo, 315 Pa. 321, 172
Atl. 139 (1934) ; Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930) ; Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934). CM-
tra, Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Conn. 491, 95 A.2d 71 (1953).
1 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888).
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erty. This shocking decision caused three statutes to be enacted in
North Carolina providing that a spouse convicted of the felonious
slaying or as an accessory before the fact of such slaying of the other
spouse thereby loses all rights in the other's personal estate including
distributive share, year's allowance, right of administration, dower
or curtesy, and all rights of property settled on the decedent solely
by reason of the marriage." In subsequent cases not within this
legislation, convicted murderers were permitted to take legal title, in
Bryant v. Bryant73 by survivorship as tenant by the entirety with the
decedent, and in Garner v. Phillip 4 as heir and distributee of the
decedent, but upon constructive trust for the persons who would have
been entitled if the murderer had predeceased his victim. This was
upon the principle that a wrongdoer shall not be permitted to profit
from his crime. Upon similar principles, the beneficiary of a life in-
surance policy who killed the insured was not permitted to collect the
proceeds.7
Since the three statutes are largely confined to depriving a guilty
spouse of intestate rights in his victim's estate and require conviction
of a felonious slaying or of being an accessory before the fact there-
to, any other persons, types of wrong or rights of property are not
covered. And suicide of the slayer before conviction would allow
him to take his victim's property, unless otherwise barred.7" Also,
these statutes only prevent the slayer from taking and do not specify
what shall happen to the property.
The common law judicial decisions involve only murder of the
victim by a tenant by the entirety, by an heir, and by an insurance
beneficiary. And though these decisions establish the principle
that such a wrongdoer may not so profit by his crime, confinement
to these particular instances could occur in future cases. Obviously,
these North Carolina statutes and common law decisions leave sig-
nificant gaps and uncertainties in the law which might require many
cases and many years to remove; and this the 1961 legislation seeks
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-10, 30-14, 52-19 (1950) [N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-
72, ch. 193, § 42, as amended, N.C. Pub. Laws 1889, ch. 499; N.C. Pub. Laws
1868-69, ch. 93, § 43; N.C. Pub. Laws 1871-72, ch. 193, § 42].
S193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948).
Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71(1951); Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931).
" Parker v. Potter, supra note 75.
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to correct by broadening and settling the law now and making its
application more certain.
IV. North Carolina Statute, 1961, Provisions Barring Slayers
Article 3 of this chapter concerns the wilful and unlawful killing
-of a decedent whose death affects certain property relations, par-
ticularly those between slayer and decedent, and seeks to effectuate
by comprehensive legislation the broad public policy of preventing
unjust enrichment by homicide by denying to the slayer of the de-
cedent the profits of his crime.
The first section of this article, G.S. § 31A-3, defines the terms
slayer, decedent and property. The subsequent sections prevent the
slayer from acquiring the property of the decedent or otherwise
deriving a proprietary benefit through his death in the following
ways: by testate or intestate succession as heir, legatee, devisee or
surviving spouse (G.S. § 31A-4); by survivorship as tenant by the
entirety (G.S. § 31A-5); by survivorship as joint tenant or joint
obligee (G.S. § 31A-6); by acceleration of a reversion or vested
remainder following a life estate in the decedent or measured by
his life (G.S. § 31A-7) ; by the vesting or increase of interest in a
contingent or other future interest on the death of the decedent
(G.S. § 31A-8) ; by the removal of a defeasibility as to any property
interest benefitting the slayer by the death of the decedent prior to
the slayer's death (G.S. § 31A-9) ; by the exercise or non-exercise
of a power of appointment or revocation by the decedent (G.S.
§ 31A-10) ; by the payment to the slayer of the proceeds of an in-
surance policy or an annuity upon the death of the decedent as
insured or beneficiary (G.S. § 3 1A-11) ; and the last section protects
a bona fide purchaser who has paid to the slayer adequate considera-
tion for property divested by this chapter and impresses a construc-
tive trust upon any funds so received by the slayer for the benefit of
the persons entitlted (G.S. § 31A-12).
§ 31A-3. As used in this article, unless the context otherwise
requires, the term (1) "Slayer" means (a) Any person who by a court
of competent jurisdiction shall have been convicted as a principal
or accessory before the fact of the wilful and unlawful killing of
another person; or (b) Any person who shall have entered a plea of
guilty in open court as -a principal or accessory before the fact of the
wilful and unlawful killing of another person; or (c) Any person who,
upon indictment or information as a principal or accessory before the
[Vol. 40
ACTS BARRING PROPERTY RIGHTS
fact of the wilful and unlawful killing of another person, shall have
tendered a plea of nolo contendere which was accepted by the court
and judgment entered thereon; or (d) Any person who shall have
been found in a civil action or proceeding brought within one year
after the death of the decedent to have wilfully and unlawfully killed
the decedent or procured his killing, and who shall have died or com-
mitted suicide before having been tried for the offense and before the
settlement of the estate.
"Decedent" is defined in subdivision (2) as the person whose
life is taken by the slayer as defined in subdivision (1). "Property"
is defined in subdivision (3) as any real or personal property and
any right or interest therein.
This, the principle definitorial section of the chapter, adopts the
term "slayer" instead of "felon" or "murderer" which occurs in a
number of the statutes, and limits the bar of the chapter to a "wilful
and unlawful killing." The object of the statute is to prevent profit
through wrong, and any degree of wrong from murder down to
misdemeanor might have been adopted as the basis of the disquali-
fication.
In selecting this degree of wrong as the one which disables a slayer
from profiting by his crime through the acquisition of a proprietary
benefit as a result of his victim's death, this section utilizes the
criterion adopted by a majority of the statutes and common law
decisions on the subject-an intentional criminal homicide.7 7 As an
expression of public policy it seems a fair standard which requires
the killing to be both unlawful and wilful.7 This duality of require-
ment excludes any killing by a noncriminal act such as mere neg-
ligence, a homicide which was justifiable or excusable or one com-
mitted while the slayer was insane, and by any non-wilful crime,
including involuntary manslaughter.7 9 As used, "wilful" would
seem to mean such an act or omission entailing criminal responsi-
"' Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Mich.
1941) ; Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Tilley, 176 Ark. 525, 3 S.W.2d
320 (1928) ; Shreiner v. High Court of I.C.O. of F., 35 Ill. App. 576 (1890) ;
Minasiam v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936). See
authorities cited note 60 supra.
" See 4 Scorr § 492.3; cases cited note 77 supra.
" State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342, 352, 103 S.E.2d 694, 701 (1958) ; State
v. Williams, 214 N.C. 682, 200 S.E.2d 399 (1939). See cases cited notes 66-
69 supra; Minasiam v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936) ;
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 28-29 (1957) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS]. But
.see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 106 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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bility on the part of the actor. This should include all cases of
murder and of manslaughter when the killing was intentional and
unlawful."0 When the decedent is so killed the niceties of distinction
between murder and manslaughter seem out of place in the determi-
nation of property rights, however appropriate to questions of life
and liberty.
This section bars a "principal or an accessory before the fact"
to the crime."1 This language utilizes the traditional terminology
and concepts of the common law of parties to the felony of homicide
generally found in case and statute law.82 As to the degree of culp-
ability, this section preserves the fundamental difference between
accessories before and after the fact by excluding the latter whose
only connection with the crime occurs subsequent to its commission
and is confined to helping the criminal escape punishment.88 By in-
cluding all principals it disregards the generally artificial distinction
between principals of the first and second degree whose guilt is the
same. 4  By expressing the statute's bar in the technical terms of
principals and accessories before the fact, it provides a wide coverage
and also supplies well-known legal criteria for decision of cases. It
qualifies as accessories before the fact those not legally present at the
commission who aided, counseled, procured or commanded the com-
mission of the homicide, and as principals, those who were legally
present and actually perpetrated the act or omission causing the
death.s5 Subject to language variations, most other statutes on the
" Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Tilley, 176 Ark. 525, 3 S.W.2d
320 (1928); Throop v. Western Indemnity Co., 49 Cal. App. 322, 193 Pac.
263 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920); PERKINS 5-6, 687-688. See also Matter of
Sparks, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Surr. Ct. 1939), discussed in Note,
40 COLUM. L. REv. 327 (1940) ; cases cited note 77 supra.
"' See for a similar provision PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7(5) (1950).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5 (1953); State v. Powell, 168 N.C. 134, 138,
135 S.E. 310, 313 (1914); In re Houghton, [1915] 2 Ch. 173; PERKINS
555-580.
"Accessory before the fact: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-56 (1953); State v.
Mozingo, 207 N.C. 247, 176 S.E. 582 (1934) ; State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803,
92 S.E. 698 (1917); PERKINS 575-78. Accessory after the fact: N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-59 (1953); State v. Williams, 229 N.C. 348, 49 S.E.2d 617
(1948); State v. Potter, 221 N.C. 153, 19 S.E.2d 257 (1942); PERKINS 578-
580.
" State v. Holland, 211 N.C. 284, 189 S.E. 761 (1937); State v. Whitt,
113 N.C. 716, 720, 18 S.E. 715, 716 (1893); PERKcINS 568-575.
" See cases and text cited notes 83-84 supra.
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subject are similar in their inclusiveness,"6 but some do not dis-
tinguish between accessories before and after the fact. 7
In legislation of this kind two important problems depending
upon the statutory language are whether a conviction in a criminal
proceeding is necessary to bar the slayer and whether such a con-
viction is conclusive. As heretofore stated, most American statutes
which disqualify a slayer from acquiring his victim's property as a
result of his death disqualify him only if he is convicted of the crime,
but a substantial number do not specifically require a conviction and
thereby leave to a civil proceeding involving title to the property
the detemination whether the slayer was for that purpose guilty
of the crime as specified by the statute.88
Section 31A-3 specifies four alternative methods of establishing
the fact that one is a "slayer" within its terms: (a) is convicted;
(b) pleads guilty; (c) is sentenced under a plea of nolo contendere
in a criminal proceeding; (d) in case of death before being tried
criminally, guilt may be established in a specified civil action. These
alternatives provide both a desirable elasticity and explicitness of
inclusion. The first three thereof specify the pleas of criminal pro-
cedure upon which a judgment or guilt may be based, 9 and in effect
this section requires a conviction or its equivalent. (a) Conviction
is by necessary implication premised upon a trial after a plea of not
guilty which results in a finding of the defendant's guilt with judg-
ment and sentence based thereon." (b) A plea of guilty is a con-
fession in open court and waiver of trial by the defendant. The
equivalent of a conviction, it is surrounded by due process safeguards
including the court's duty to see that the defendant understands its
consequences, the requirement in felony cases that he personally
make the plea, and a liberal privilege of withdrawal of the plea. 1
The importance of its express inclusion by this section is apparent
8 5Rees, supra note 49, at 889; authorities cited note 60 supra.
ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 60-1-15 (1948) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§152-2-13 (1954); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §45-279 (1958); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (1954).
884 ScoTr § 492.4; Rees, supra note 49, at 888, 889.
8 8 ORFIELI), CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 290-292
(1947).
" State v. Cunningham, 94 N.C. 824 (1886). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-
162 (1953); 2 JEROME, CRIMINAL CoDE & DIGEST OF NORTH CAROLINA§ 2249 (7th ed. 1958) ; ORFIELD, op. cit. suepra note 89.81State v. Branner, 149 N.C. 559, 63 S.E. 169 (1908) ; ORFIELD, Op. cit.
supra note 89, at 293-303; Annot., 6 A.L.R. 696 (1920).
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when it is remembered that about eighty-five per cent of all con-
victions of serious crimes are on a plea of guilty which usually
results from acceptance by the prosecution of such plea to a lesser
offense than that originally charged. 2  A 1953 North Carolina
statute93 expressly sanctions this procedure as to capital cases,
including murder in the first degree, by permitting the court to
accept such plea when in writing signed by the defendant and his
counsel, with the effect of a verdict of guilty and recommendation
of life imprisonment. Prior to this statute the plea was not allowed
as to murder in the first degree.94 (c) The plea of nolo contendere
is a matter of grace requiring the court's consent, and although not
an explicit admission of guilt, it is treated as a plea of guilty for
purposes of the particular case.9 5 Thus its inclusion here. (d) The
final alternative which permits the status of "slayer" to be established
in a specified civil action is applicable only when the alleged "slayer"
dies or commits suicide before he is tried criminally. It plugs a
loophole that might otherwise exist under such a statute which by
its terms bars only a person who is tried in a criminal proceeding
and is convicted or adjudged guilty of the specified crime, an im-
possibility as to a decedent,96 unless such requirement is judicially
dispensed with as by admission of the crime in the pleadings of
a civil action concerning title to the property affected. 7
Establishment of disqualifying guilt in a civil proceeding is no
anomaly because under statutes not requiring a conviction to bar the
killer a civil action trying title to the property involved determines
for its purposes whether or not he was guilty of the crime," but this
does permit guilt of the crime to be proved in such case by the
" HALL, TuEr, LAW AND SociETY 113-15 (1935).
9
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-162.1 (Supp. 1959), discussed in 31 N.C.L. REV.
407 (1952).
" State v. Simmons, 236 N.C. 340, 72 S.E.2d 743 (1952).
" State v. Barbour, 243 N.C. 265, 90 S.E.2d 388 (1955) ; State v. Burnett,
174 N.C. 796, 93 S.E. 473 (1917); 2 JERomE, op. cit. snupra note 90, at§ 2103.5; OanFrlD, op. cit. supra note 89, at 292.
"Peeples v. Corbett, 117 Fla. 213, 147 So. 510 (1934); Bruns v. Cope,
182 Ind. 289, 105 N.E. 471 (1914); Hogg v. Whithan, 120 Kan. 341, 242
Pac. 1021 (1926); Shuman v. Schick, 95 Ohio App. 413, 120 N.E.2d 530
(1953); Estate of Tarlo, 315 Pa. 321, 172 Ad. 139 (1934); Smith v. Todd,
155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930).
" Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1930).
" Harrison v. Moncravie, 264 Fed. 776 (8th Cir. 1920) ; Sovereign Camp
W.O.W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491 (1933); In re Estate of John-
ston, 220 Iowa 328, 261 N.W. 908 (1935); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934), discussed in Note, 41 W. VA.
L.Q. 287 (1935); BoGERT §478; 4 ScoTr §492.4.
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weight of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt as.
required in a criminal proceeding. 9  However, when only property
rights between persons are at stake this distinction appears desirable-
And to whatever extent the act's conviction requirement is tanta--
mount to compelling proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil action,
as to the property involved it may be unnecessarily strict.
The statutory requisites of the alternative civil action or proceed-
ing are that it shall be brought within a year of decedent's death,
must establish that the alleged slayer wilfully and unlawfully killed
the decedent or procured his killing, and that he died or committed
suicide both before trial for the offense and settlement of the de-
cedent's estate. The precise nature of this action is not disclosed by
the statute. Civil actions readily suggesting themselves are the
above mentioned types of action affecting title to the property in-
volved, or a wrongful death action in behalf of the decedent's estate
brought by his personal representative.' That the action be
"brought within one year after the death of the decedent," and the:
requirement that the suicide or other death of the alleged slayer occur-
before "settlement of the estate" point to a wrongful death action:
because one year was the applicable statute of limitations as to such
actions until changed in 1951 to two years;... and since only the
personal representative can bring this action this could not normally
occur after his discharge upon settlement of the decedent's estate. 02
As to actions involving title to property covered by this act,
unless it be an asset of the decedent's estate, the date when his estate
was closed would seem immaterial, and in all such cases the current
one-year statute of limitations would seem irrelevant. 03  Since botlh
the wrongful death action and the action involving title to the
affected property seem equally appropriate for establishment of the
status of "slayer" under this fourth alternative, these statutory re--
quirements may be unduly restrictive and sometimes arbitrary.
"Peeples v. Corbett, 117 Fla. 213, 157 So. 510 (1934); MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 318, 321 (1954) ; In re Pollock, [1941] Ch. 219; and see N.C-
GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-13 to -15 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 2, 1961). For-
additional discussion of aspects of this problem, see ARTICLE 4, infra.
...N.C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (Supp. 1959); Note, 25 N.C.L. REV. 84
(1946). And the slayer should be ineligible to receive any of the award.
Pearson v. National Manufacture & Stores Corp., 219 N.C. 717, 14 S.E.2d.
811 (1941).
101 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53 (1955).
"
02 McCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 229 N.C. 57, 47 S.E.2d 53Z
(1948).
...N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54 (1953).
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Subdivisions (2) and (3) seem to require but limited comment.
Subdivision (2) defines the term "decedent" in terms of subdivision
(1), and seems to be self-explanatory. Subdivision (3) gives the
term "property" a broad meaning because, as heretofore pointed out,
similar statutes have been strictly construed, and unless the specific
interest or property relation is clearly within the terms of the statute
the slayer may not be disqualified by the statute from its receipt or
retention.10 4
§ 31A-4. The slayer shall be deemed to have died immediately
prior to the death of the decedent and the following rules shall apply:
(1) The slayer shall not acquire any property or receive any benefit
from the estate of the decedent by testate or intestate succession or
by common law or statutory right as surviving spouse of the decedent.
(2) Where the decedent dies intestate as to property which would
have passed to the slayer by intestate succession, such propetry shall
pass to others next in succession in accordance with the applicable
provision of the Intestate Succession Act.
(3) Where the decedent dies testate as to property which would
have passed to the slayer pursuant to the will, such property shall
pass as if the decedent had died intestate with respect thereto, unless
otherwise disposed of by the will.
This section prevents a slayer from acquiring any property or
receiving any benefits from the decedent's estate as his heir, his
legatee or devisee, and by common law or statutory right as his
surviving spouse, by its provision that a slayer shall be deemed "to
have died immediately prior to" his victim. Rights as surviving
spouse simply do not accrue and subsections (2) and (3) specify
what happens to property which would otherwise pass from the de-
cedent to the slayer by testate or intestate succession. Intestate
property goes to the other heirs of the decedent next in succession.
Testate property passes to the decedent's heirs other than the slayer
unless otherwise disposed of by the will-for example, to an alterna-
tive beneficiary or by way of residuary disposition to others than
the slayer. These provisions exclude the slayer and should prevent
possible application of an anti-lapse statute giving the decedent's
property to a person not his heir-for example, to issue of decedent's
slayer-spouse by a prior marriage.15
10. See cases cited note 64 supra.1 5
'.C. GEL. STAT. § 31-42 to -42.2 (Supp. 1959); and see Wade, Ac-
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The other American statutes almost uniformly preclude a slayer
from acquiring the victim's property by testacy or intestacy; some
include marital property, rights, and several list cotenancy with sur-
vivorship."'0 Its disposition varies. Most of them treat testate and
intestate property alike by giving it to the other heirs as if the slayer
had predeceased the decedent; some treat legacies and devises to the
slayer as revoked; while others merely prevent the slayer from taking
the property without providing what shall happen to it.'
0 7
Common law dower and curtesy were abolished as to persons
dying on or after July 1, 1960, by the Intestate Succession Act.Y08
In their stead this act makes husband and wife preferred heirs of
each other and gives the surviving spouse a forced absolute share in
the decedent's estate,'09 or an optional life estate in one-third of the
real property of which decedent was seised in fee simple during the
coverture," 0 both of which are protected by the survivor's right to
dissent from decedent's will if he has not received at least the amount
of his intestate share."' Other such property rights of the surviving
spouse include homestead and year's allowance. 111a Except for
these rights of the surviving spouse, no testate or intestate successor
as such has more than a mere expectancy as to the decedent's prop-
erty and estate," 2 and the establishment of law as to such successions
is a legislative prerogative."2
Fundamental to this area of law which seeks to prevent a killer
from profiting by his crime is the distinction between taking a
slayer's property because of his crime, and preventing him from so
acquiring property. Whereas a slayer may not be deprived of his
property because of his crime, he may be constitutionally prevented
by statute from acquiring property thereby. Thus, this statute,
which prevents unjust enrichment by providing that a slayer shall
not thereby inherit from his victim or take by his will, takes nothing
quisition, of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution,
49 HARv. L. REv. 715 (1936).
..8 See authorities cited notes 56-59 supra.
"" Rees, American Will Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REv. 856 (1960); Wade,
supra note 105.8 N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-4 (Supp. 1959). See generally Bolich, Elec-
tion, Dissent and Renunciation, 39 N.C.L. REV. 17 (1960).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-41 (Supp. 1959).
"'
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1959).
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 to -3 (Supp. 1959).
""N.C. Gra. STAT. §30-15 (Adv. Leg. Serv. Supp. No. 5, 1961).
11.3 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 316 (1940).
..2 See Pullen v. Commissioners, 66 N.C. 361 (1872).
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already owned but constitutionally prevents a wrongful acquisi-
tion.1 3 Its provision that such property when not otherwise willed
by the decedent, shall pass to his other heirs next in succession
prevents "corruption of the blood" because the slayer's issue will
generally take in their own right by representation of their "de-
ceased" parent the share he would have taken." 4 And by specifying
that he is deemed to have died immediately prior to the decedent it
fixes a date of "death."" 5
As to the slayer's property rights as surviving spouse, since the
forced share is a fraction of the decedent's probate estate, there is no
inter vivos interest in the other's property to be taken, but the
elective life estate is an inter vivos interest, analogous to common
law inchoate dower." 6 It might be contended that the act's pre-
venting this right from becoming consummate by survival as the
result of the slayer's killing his spouse is unconstitutional legisla-
tion. However, since such a nonvested marital property right and
its statutory substitute, the forced absolute share of decedent's estate,
may by the great weight of authority be statutorily abridged or
abolished prior to the death of the other spouse," 7 this statutory
prevention of the profits of survivorship through crime seems
valid." And the same would seem true as to homesteadlsa and
year's allowance.
Sections 31A-5 and 31A-6 are concerned with the same basic
question of providing a solution for the problem which occurs when
11 Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 Pac. 678 (1918); Henry v.
Toney, 217 Miss. 716, 64 So. 2d 904 (1953) ; Legette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403,
85 S.E.2d 576 (1955); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 187, comment c
(1937); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1408 (1920); cases and text cited note 53 supra.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-15(1)-(2) (Supp. 1959); Wilson v. Bates, 313
Ky. 592, 231 S.W.2d 39 (1950).
.. See Re Peacock, [1957] 2 S.A. Eng. R. 98.
... Bolich, supra note 108, at 26, 34-36.
11. Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137 (1874); Griswold v.
McGee, 102 Minn. 114, 112 N.W. 1020 (1907); Walker v. Long, 109 N.C.
510, 14 S.E. 299 (1891); Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 7 S.E. 335
(1888); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1330 (1922). Contra, O'Kelly v. Williams, 84
N.C. 281 (1881). See generally ScuRLocx, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND 285 (1953).
1" Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d 525 (1945); In re Spark's
Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Surr. Ct. 1939); Pinder's Estate, 61
Pa. D. & C. 193 (Orphan's Ct. 1947) (seinbIe); 4 Scott § 492.2. Contra,
Crumley v. Hall, 202 Ga. 588, 43 S.E.2d 646 (1957), discussed in Note, 26
N.C.L. REv. 232 (1948).
""'a Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371, 137 S.W. 257 (1911); ScuRLoCK,
op. cit. supra note 117.
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one concurrent owner of property subject to the incident of sur-
vivorship wrongfully kills another and thereby assures his own sur-
vival and the benefits of the incident of survivorship with its
resulting unjust enrichment at the expense of his victim. Common
law joint tenancy, tenancy by the entireties and other property and
contract concurrent interests with a common law or conventional
right of survivorship, including joint bank accounts, will therefore be
treated together.
§ 31A-5. Where the slayer and decedent hold property as tenants
by the entirety: (1) If the wife is the slayer, one-half of the property
shall pass upon the death of the husband to his estate, and the other
one-half shall be held by the wife during her life, subject to pass upon
her death to the estate of the husband; and (2) If the husband is the
slayer, he shall hold all of the property during his life subject to pass
upon his death to the estate of the wife.
This section covers cases in which the slayer is tenant by the
,entireties with the decedent, and provides different solutions depend-
ing upon whether husband or wife is the slayer.
By subsection (1), if the wife is the slayer, one-half passes
forthwith to the decedent's estate and the other half is held by the
slayer for her life and passes at her death to the decedent's estate,
i.e., the whole property goes to the decedent's estate subject to a
life estate in the slayer in one-half thereof. By subsection (2) if the
husband is the slayer, he holds all of the property for his life subject
to pass at his death to the decedent's estate, i.e., the whole property
goes to the decedent's estate subject to a life estate in the slayer.
At first one might think that such discrimination against the
slayer-wife is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the
laws. To the contrary, it is deemed necessary in order to prevent
the slayer-husband from perhaps having his vested property right
unconstitutionally forfeited for crime or taken from him without
due process of law, because North Carolina still clings to the anachro-
nistic common law rule that where husband and wife are tenants by
the entireties "the husband has the control and use of the property,
.and is entitled to the possession, income, and usufruct thereof during
their joint lives."" 9
Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 378, 137 S.E. 188, 191 (1927);
Diamond v. Ganci, 328 Mass. 315, 103 N.E.2d 716 (1952); 4 PovFLu
623-24.
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One of the two other states observing this rule has indulged no
such qualms of constitutionality for the protection of the slayer-
husband's usufruct.' ° Thus, by the act the slayer-husband keeps
the whole income or property for his life after which the whole
corpus passes to the decedent's estate, while the slayer-wife is given
half the income or property for her life after which the whole corpus
passes to the decedent's estate.
At common law the conveyance of a freehold to two persons
was deemed to create a joint tenancy, unless it was to husband and
wife, when it created a tenancy by the entireties. They took as one
fictitious entity having one and the same interest and held by one
and the same undivided possession. Thus by orthodox common law
property theory each cotenant in joint tenancy and tenancy by the
entireties owns the whole estate, is seised per tout, and holds subject
to a mutual right of survivorship whereby when one tenant dies his
interest ceases and leaves complete ownership in the survivor.
121
In ordinary joint tenancy each has equal rights of possession and
enjoyment during their joint lives and the right to sever the joint
cotenancy and destroy the mutual right of survivorship by partition
or conveying his interest, but in tenancy by the entireties this right of
severance by conveyance or partition does not exist, and husband and
wife have equal rights of possession and enjoyment in most of the
twenty-one states still recognizing tenancy by the entireties. 2
In case one joint tenant or tenant by the entireties unlawfully
kills the other and thereby severs the cotenancy, strict construction
of general slayer statutes and paucity of express statutory coverage
has caused the courts to evolve at least four principal solutions: (a)
slayer gets absolute title to the whole property by survivorship
through the medieval common law theory that he has gained nothing
by his crime because he already owned the whole estate of which he
cannot be legally deprived for crime ;123 (b) slayer gets nothing and
120 Dombrowski v. Gorecki, 291 Mich. 678, 289 N.W. 293 (1939).
.. I1 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§6.1-.2, 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952);
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 418, 430 (3d ed. 1939).
1224 POWELL 617-18, 623-24.
12 Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950) (joint tenancy).
Doctrine modified: Bradley v. Fox, 7 11. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955);
Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935) (joint bank ac-
count); Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939) (tenancy by
the entireties); Hamner v. Kinnan, 16 Pa. D. & C. 395 (C.P. of Indiana
County 1931) (tenancy by the entireties); see Note, 29 CHi.-KENT L. Rnv.
260 (1951), for this view.
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absolute title to the whole property belongs to the victim's estate
because the right of survivorship is subject to the rule that one shall
not profit by his own wrong; in other words the killer is not allowed
to destroy his victim's right of survivorship and profit by his crime
by making himself the survivor and sole absolute owner of the
whole property in defiance of the equitable principle against unjust
enrichment by crime;"24 (c) slayer takes legal title to the whole
property subject to a constructive trust as to all or a part of the
property for the victim's estate depending upon the respective life
expectancies of the parties in some jurisdictions.'25
Based upon arguments from both theories (a) and (b), solution
(c) is technically unobjectionable because the slayer holds the
legal title while decedent's estate has beneficial enjoyment of the
property. In reality, however, the slayer's vested property right in
his share of its income is thereby taken from him in some juris-
dictions.
A fourth theory (d) is the relatively recent tenancy in common
theory by which decedent's wrongful death severs the joint tenancy
or tenancy by the entireties and converts it into a tenancy in common
with the slayer owning one-half beneficially and the decedent's estate
the other half. This theory divides the property evenly, and does
not make the innocent heirs of the slayer pay for their ancestor's
crime; it is therefore approved by some writers.'2 6
Theory (a), by giving the slayer his bounty on the basis of the
fiction that he gains nothing by survivorship, puts a premium on
technicality and rewards crime; theory (b) is too harsh on the slayer
and may unconstitutionally take a vested property right from him;
theory (c) does obeisance to property orthodoxy but also produces
12, Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct.
1918) (tenancy by the entireties); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87,
279 N.Y. Supp. 176 (1935) (joint bank account); It re King's Estate, 261
Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952) (joint tenancy).
... Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (Ct. Ch. 1951) (tenancy
by entireties, all, expectancies immaterial); Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295,
54 N.W.2d 385 (1952) (joint bank account, all, expectancies immaterial);
Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927) (tenancy by entireties,
all, victim younger); Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517
(Ct. Ch. 1933) (tenancy by entireties, part, victim older).
12 Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951) (tenancy by the en-
tireties); Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954) (tenancy by the
entireties); Goldsmith v. Pearce, 345 Mich. 146, 75 N.W.2d 810 (1956)
(tenancy by the entireties) ; Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464
(1948) (tenancy by the entireties) ; Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27
S.W.2d 757 (1930); see also text note 8 supra as to all four theories.
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a result akin to theory (b) except when the slayer is allowed a life
income as to part of the property; and (d) is basically partition by
homicide and except for the veil of tenancy in common achieves
practically the same result as if a joint tenant had forced a partition
or a tenant by the entireties had secured a divorce, and seems to
reward the slayer too much by leaving him the owner of half of the
property in order to protect his innocent heirs against forfeiture
of their expectancy. However, in connection with this solicitude
for the slayer's heirs, it should be remembered that in all of the
entireties cases slayer and decedent are husband and wife and where
their only issue is of their marriage, the heirs of both parties are
normally the same.'27 Moreover, in almost all of the killings affect-
ing property rights under this chapter if the homicide does not
involve husband-wife it is probably intra-family so that the heirs
of both parties are likely to be the same persons. Also, unless
the slayer has already died intestate there is no certainty that his
innocent heirs will get the benefit of the property. On the con-
trary, the chances of their getting it through the decedent may be
greater.
However and whenever one of two cotenants dies the joint
tenancy or tenancy by the entireties technically ends, and the legis-
lative task is to work out a fair disposition of the property in the
light of public policy, property concepts and constitutional mandates.
While the remedy provided by this section does not adopt in its
entirety any single one of the above mentioned judicial solutions
it establishes a fair and definite rule which respects property con-
cepts as constitutionally required by protection of the slayer's vested
rights. It effectuates public policy by preserving the whole property
for the innocent victim's estate by preventing the slayer's unjust en-
richment. This is accomplished as to the incident of surivorship
by deeming him to have predeceased the decedent as in the analogous
'cases of testate and intestate succession. 2 In so doing it disregards
the statistical life expectancies of slayer and decedent and assumes
... See Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954), where each had
issue by a prior marriage.
128 See the cases and authorities notes 9 and 10 supra. See also Wyckoff
v. Clark, 77 Pa. D. & C. 249 (C.P. of Luzerne County 1951). For endorse-
ments of this solution, see Ames, Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His
Crime and Keep It?, 36 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 225, 310, 320-21 (1897), and
A Striking Omission in the New York Statute of Devolution, 2 FIDUcIARY
L. CHR. 15, 16 (1931).
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that the latter would have survived. This seems justified because
it prevents an unjust gain and the slayer has wrongfully prevented
the natural determination of survivorship by killing the decedent.'2 9
A possible objection to the rule of this section is the fact that when
the slayer dies the whole property goes to the decedent's estate in-
stead of one share passing to the slayer or to his estate, and thereby
frustrates the expectancy of his innocent heirs. As previously
pointed out, since it seems more desirable that the whole property
belong to the decedent's estate, the validity of this objection is
questionable.
§ 31A-6. (a) Where the slayer and the decedent hold property
with right of survivorship as joint tenants, joint owners, joint obligees
or otherwise, the decedent's share thereof shall pass immediately upon
the death of the decedent to his estate, and the slayer's share shall
be held by the slayer during his lifetime and at his death shall pass
to the estate of the decedent. During his lifetime, the slayer shall
have the right to the income from his share of the property subject
to the rights of creditors of the slayer.
(b) Where three or more persons, including the slayer and the
decedent, hold property with right of survivorship as joint tenants,
joint owners, joint obligees or otherwise, the portion of the decedent's
share which would have accrued to the slayer as a result of the death
of the decedent shall pass to the estate of the decedent. If the slayer
becomes the final survivor, one-half of the property then held by the
slayer shall pass immediately to the 'estate of the decedent, and upon
the death of the slayer the remaining interest of the slayer shall pass
to the estate of the decedent. During his lifetime the slayer shall have
the right to the income from his share of the property subject to the
rights of creditors of the slayer.
Whereas the prior section is confined to the problem of sur-
vivorship in tenancy by the entireties when one spouse is slayer and
the other is decedent, this section covers the other cases involving
two or more co-owners of property or co-obligees of contract subject
to a common law or conventional incident of survivorship, including
such joint bank accounts.
In these cases each person is a joint tenant or other co-owner
... See Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (Ct. Ch. 1951);
Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952); Bryant v. Bryant,
193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 187,
comment b (1937).
1962]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
with the right to convey his interest and compel partition ;18 is a
co-obligee of a joint bank account with a total or partial right of
withdrawal;131 or is an obligee or payee of an instrument such as a
bond or note which may be payable to either or both of its obligees or
payees, 13 coupled in each case with the possibility of absolute owner-
ship of the whole by survivorship. As indicated by the references,
courts in other states have solved the killer-survivor problem in these
situations in a variety of ways, but to date no North Carolina de-
cision seems to exist.
The common law incident of survivorship in ordinary joint
tenancy has been abolished in this state as to estates in fee simple,188
but it seems that a conventional right of survivorship may be
created by contract as to some joint tenancies, bank accounts and
other types of concurrent property and contract interests. 4  And
since tenancy by the entireties is inapplicable to personal property
in this state, a transfer of such property to husband and wife which
would otherwise constitute a tenancy by the entireties creates a joint
tenancy.
13 5
The solution of this section is the same in principle as that of the
prior section, i.e., where a slayer's interest in property would, in
fact, be enlarged by his survivorship of the decedent he is not per-
mitted so to enrich himself by homicide at the expense of his victim.
This is accomplished by deeming the slayer to have predeceased the
'lit re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952); Neiman
v. Hurff, supra note 129.
... Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952); Bierbrauer v.
Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176 (1935); Wade, supra note
105, at 733-34; see Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
.. See Ervin v. Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402 (1945); Note,
95 U. PA. L. Rnv. 799 (1947).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-2 (1950) ; Burton v. Cahill, 192 N.C. 505, 135
S.E. 332 (1926).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2.1 (Supp. 1959) (husband and wife joint ac-
count); Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515, 91 S.E.2d 176 (1956) (joint
savings accounts); Ervin v. Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402 (1945) (U.S.
saving bonds); Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N.C. 178, 7 S.E.2d 366 (1940)
(savings and loan certificate); Taylor v. Smith, 116 N.C. 531, 21 S.E. 202
(1895) (promissory note); McCall, Some Problems in Administration of
Estates, 35 N.C.L. REv. 341-42, 354 (1957). See Buffaloe v. Barnes, 226
N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946) (stock certificate); Note, 25 N.C.L. REV.
90 (1946).
.. Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N.C. 283, 119 S.E. 366 (1923); Note, 6
N.C.L. Rav. 342 (1928). As to partition, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-42
(1950).
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decedent for purposes of survivorship and partition. Thus, sub-
section (a) provides that where two persons hold a property or
contract interest with right of survivorship and one kills the other
the decedent's share of the property belongs absolutely to his estate
and the slayer retains a life estate in his share of the property which
at his death belongs absolutely to the decedent's estate.' 8 By killing
the decedent the slayer assures himself of survival, prevents a natural
determination of who would have survived, and criminally deprives
the decedent of both his life and his chance of surviving and thereby
owning the whole property absolutely.
In case of a conventional right of survivor'ship, survival by
homicide could never have been within the contemplation of the
grantor or grantees to the creation of such a cotenancy. Certainly,
a provision for survivorship if one co-owner wilfully and unlawfully
killed the other would be violative of public policy and void. During
the joint lives of the slayer and the decedent each has a mutual right
to partition or to convey his interest. A partition severs the co-
tenancy and each thereafter owns his share in severalty. If after
the death of the decedent the slayer is permitted to partition the
property and thereby acquire an absolute interest he is unjustly en-
riched at the expense of the decedent. By treating the decedent as
the survivor, such a partition is prevented. As to a joint bank
account the interests of the parties are presumed to be equal,'31 and,
as between themselves, one party's rightful withdrawal of the whole
is generally held not to terminate the other's interest in the ac-
count.13
8
Subsection (b) covers the situation where there are more than
two co-owners or co-obligees. When the slayer kills the decedent,
because of the interests of the other co-owners, it is not possible to
say that any particular portion of the property then vests finally in
the estate of the decedent. But whatever enrichment the slayer
would have acquired eventually as a result of the death of the de-
cedent will go to the decedent's estate.
If S (slayer), D (decedent) and A own as joint tenants with
right of survivorship and D dies naturally, this would change the
thirds to halves in A and S. If on the other hand, S kills D and
"' RESTATEMFNT, RESTITUTION § 188 (1937); 4 ScoTT § 493.2.
... Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 243, 190 N.W. 698 (1922).
" Waters v. Nevis, 31 Cal. App. 511, 160 Pac. 1081 (Dist. Ct. App.
1916).
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there is no rule of law preventing S from acquiring his portion of D's
share, then A and S would own one-half each; but if S is prevented
by law from benefitting by killing D, A would get his pro rata part
of D's share (one-half of one-third, or one-sixth) and D's estate
would retain whatever gain would otherwise have gone to S (one-
sixth). A then has one-third plus one-sixth, or one-half, and S con-
tinues the owner of one-third of the property plus a part of D's share,
one-half of one-third, which one-sixth S in effect holds on con-
structive trust for D's estate. If A now predeceases S the property
will be treated as though S and D had been the only persons orig-
inally entitled and D the survivor, thereby making D's estate the
absolute owner subject to a life estate in S as to his share.
§ 31A-7. (a) Where the slayer holds a reversion or vested re-
mainder in property subject to a life estate in the decedent and the
slayer would have obtained the right of present possession upon the
death of the decedent, such property shall pass to the estate of the
decedent during the period of the life expectancy of the decedent.
(b) Where the slayer holds a reversion or vested remainder in
property subject to a life estate in a third person which is measured
by the life of the decedent, such property shall remain in the posses-
sion of the third person during the period of the life expectancy of
the decedent.
In this and the two succeeding sections, this chapter deals with
survivorship between slayer and decedent where future interests are
involved and they are successive owners of property subject to a
condition precedent of survival or a defeasance by non-survival, as
distinguished from concurrent owners of property subject to a
common law or conventional incident of survivorship. Regarding
ownership as of potentially infinite duration, an owner is permitted
within limits to divide it between persons by conveying it to them
in the form of chronologically successive time segments, each having
a duration of its own. This occurs in family settlements of property
with their life estates and remainders or defeasible fees and execu-
tory interests, and their frequency usually results from an effort to
gratify the vanity of the dead hand or to lessen the impact of the
taxman's axe.
Since the rules stated in these sections use the common law
terminology of reversions, remainders and executory interests with
their distinctions, it seems desirable at this juncture to mention
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certain of these classifications. All reversions are vested and re-
mainders are either vested or contingent. A remainder is vested
if it is certain to take effect in possession and enjoyment when-
ever and however the particular estate ends, and it is contingent if
some condition precedent other than the determination of the par-
ticular estate is necessary.'39 Reversions and vested remainders
may be indefeasibly vested (to A for life remainder to B in fee),
vested subject to partial defeasance (to A for life remainder to the
children of A in fee), or vested subject to total defeasance (to A for
life remainder to B in fee, but if B predeceases A, to C in fee) ;14o
and so may certain executory interests be vested in fact, if not in
legal theory.14'
This section covers the situation where the slayer owns a vested
future interest in property in the form of a reversion or vested re-
mainder, his possession and enjoyment thereof being postponed only
by the existence of a prior life estate in the decedent, or an estate
pur autre vie in another person which is measured by the life of the
decedent. 42 Since the only impediment to the slayer's possession
and enjoyment is the particular estate, its removal accelerates the
reversion or remainder which thereby becomes a possessory interest,
and the slayer is unjustly enriched by such acceleration of his future
interest to whatever extent it is permitted to occur. It is not possible
to measure this gain by acceleration exactly because of the impossi-
bility of determining when the life tenant would have died, naturally
or unnaturally, had he not been killed by the slayer. The only
feasible and legally acceptable approximation of decedent's ex-
pectancy is furnished by the mortality tables. 4 '
As an equitable solution, subsection (a) prevents tlhe slayer from
benefitting by such a wrongfully induced acceleration by giving the
property to the decedent's estate for the period of his expectancy,
after which it vests in possession in the slayer or his estate.
And upon similar principle, subsection (b) provides that when
the particular estate is an estate pur autre vie with the decedent as
1
.. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 101, 113 (4th ed. 1942);
2 POWELL 274, 278.1 02 POWELL 274-76; 2 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 157 (1936).
..1 See Lee v. Oates, 171 N.C. 717, 88 S.E. 889 (1916) ; SIMES, FuTURE
INTERESTS § 11 (1951).
12 Cooper v. Cooper, 220 N.C. 490, 17 S.E.2d 655 (1941); 2 POWELL
312; 2 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 238 (1936).
.. RESTATEMENT, REsTITUTION § 188, comment c (1937) ; 4 ScoTT § 493.1;
Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1120 (1952).
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cestui que vie the property shall remain with the tenant pur autre vie
for the period of the life expectancy of the decedent before passing
to the slayer or his estate.'
This section preserves to the slayer his vested future interest
which comes to him from the transferor and not from his victim,
but prevents any unjust enrichment which would otherwise result
to him by his killing the life tenant and thereby accelerating his
possession and enjoyment of the property. In the absence of specific
statutory prevention it has been held that such a remainderman is so
entitled.'O
§ 31A-8. As to any contingent remainder or executory or other
future interest held by the slayer subject to become vested in him or
increased in any way for him upon the condition of the death of the
decedent: (1) If the interest would not have become vested or in-
creased if he had predeceased the decedent, he shall be deemed to have
so predeceased the decedent; but (2) In any case, the interest shall
not be vested or increased during the period of the life expectancy
of the decedent.
This general section purports to include all types of future in-
terests subject to become vested in the slayer or to be beneficially
enlarged as to him in any way as a condition of the decedent's death.
Subsection (1) provides that if the slayer's interest is a contingent
one which is subject to the condition precedent of his surviving the
decedent, or is a contingent or vested one which will be benefically
enlarged upon the condition of his surviving the decedent, in both
cases the slayer will be deemed to have predeceased the decedent.
The same basic principle of prevention of unjust enrichment from
survivorship by homicide that was involved in the concurrent owner-
ship cases recurs here.
When the slayer's interest is contingent upon his surviving the
decedent it is impossible to say that he would have received anything
but for his crime because he might have predeceased the decedent
and taken nothing. In such case the interest should pass as though
the slayer had predeceased the decedent; for example, where prop-
erty is conveyed "to D for life remainder to S (slayer) in fee if he
" AI Es, LECTUREs ON LEGAL HISTORY 320-21 (1913), suggests this
solution.
" Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914) ; In re Emer-
son's Estate, 191 Iowa 900, 183 N.W. 327 (1921); Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192
Va. 337, 64 S.E.2d 809 (1951).
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survives D (decedent) but if S does not survive D, to A in fee"
(contingent remainder) ; or "to D for life remainder to S in fee, but
if he predeceases D, to A in fee" (vested remainder subject to de-
feasance) ; or "to D in fee but if he predecease S to A in fee" (shift-
ing executory interest). In all of these cases where S kills D he is
deemed to have predeceased him and the property should pass to
A.146 Of course, if some third person kills the life tenant an innocent
remainderman is not prejudiced, and either a contingent remainder
dependent upon his survival or a vested remainder will not thereby
be prevented from vesting forthwith in possession and enjoyment. 47
Subsection (b) provides that in any case where the slayer's
future interest would be benefitted by the decedent's death, although
his interest is not contingent upon his survival of the decedent,
nevertheless any benefit the slayer would have received by reason
of the decedent's death shall be postponed for the period of the life
expectancy of the decedent and thereby prevent the slayer from
gaining by the decedent's death. For example, if property is con-
veyed "to D (decedent) for life, remainder to S (slayer) in fee"
this remainder is indefeasibly vested and S or his estate will receive
the benefit of it whether or not the slayer survives decedent. To
assume that the slayer predeceased his victim, as provided in sub-
section (a), would not prevent his getting the property. Therefore
his enjoyment of the property is postponed for the period of de-
cedent's expectancy, the property or its income meanwhile remaining
in the decedent's estate for that period of time, which prevents the
slayer's unjust enrichment by wrongful acceleration of his future
interest.14
8
§ 31A-9. Where the slayer holds any interest in property, whether
vested or not, subject to be divested, diminished in any way or ex-
tinguished if the decedent survives him or lives to a certain age, such
interest shall be held by the slayer during his lifetime or until the
decedent would have reached such age but shall then pass as if the
decedent had died immediately after the death of the slayer or the
reaching of such age.
1.. In re Emerson's Estate, supra note 145; See Eisenhardt v. Siegel,
343 Mo. 22, 119 S.W.2d 810 (1938), discussed in Note, 37 MIcH. L. REv.
965 (1939); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 188, comment c (1937).
" 4 ScoTr § 492.5.
.RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 188, comment c (1937). See 4 ScoTr
§§ 493-493.1.
1962]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
This section covers the miscellaneous situations where the slayer
holds a present or future interest in property subject to divestiture
or diminution if he predeceases the decedent, or if the decedent lives
to some named age. Where the slayer already owns such a vested
interest it cannot be legally taken from him because of his crime,
and the available procedure is to allow the slayer to retain his in-
terest but to make it remain subject to the chance of being divested
by the decedent's survival. Since it cannot be known whether the
decedent would have lived to survive the slayer or to reach a named
age, all doubt is resolved against the slayer in order to prevent his
unjust enrichment, and it is presumed that the decedent survived
him. This assumption having divested the slayer of the interest at
the proper time, the property will then pass as if the decedent had
died immediately thereafter. For example, if property is conveyed
"to S (slayer) in fee but if D (decedent) survives S, then to D in
fee," if S kills D, S holds the property for his own life only and
then it passes to D's estate; or, if property is conveyed "to S in
fee but if D attains age twenty-five, then to D in fee," if S kills
D who is then eighteen years of age, S holds the property until D
would have attained age twenty-five, and then it passes to D's estate.
If it were not for the implication of the word "holds," this sec-
tion might possibly be interpreted to cover the oft-occurring type of
situation where property is bequeathed or devised to alternative
beneficiaries, for example, "to D (decedent) but if he fail to survive
me (testator), then to S (slayer) if he survive me." If S kills
D and thereby makes himself survivor he should not under the
policy of this act be permitted to reap the harvest of his crime, but
since this situation involves substitutionary rather than successive
taking of property, it does not seem to be covered.
§ 31A-10. (a) As to any exercise in the will of the decedent of a
power of appointment in favor of the slayer, the slayer shall be
deemed to have predeceased the decedent and the slayer shall not
acquire any property or receive any benefit by virtue of such appoint-
ment and the appointed property shall pass in accordance with the
applicable lapse statute, if any.
(b) Property held either presently or in remainder by the slayer
subject to be divested by the exercise by the decedent of a power of
revocation or a general power of appointment shall pass to the estate
of the decedent; and property so held by the slayer subject to be
divested by the exercise by the decedent of a power of appointment
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to a particular person or persons or to a class of persons shall pass
to such person or persons or in equal shares to the members of such
class of persons, exclusive of the slayer.
This section deals with the power of appointment, one of today's
most widely used dispositive devices. In many cases the elasticity
it affords in the hands of a family survivor or corporate trustee
dictates its use, but in sizeable estates it is often an estate planning
must. In such cases a life estate in the surviving spouse coupled
with a taxable ("general") power is generally utilized to qualify
one-half of the adjusted gross estate for the federal estate tax saving
afforded by the marital deduction, while a similar life interest as to
the residue of the estate coupled with a non-taxable ("special")
power permits that part of the estate to pass in remainder free of
a second federal estate tax levy. 4 ' While such a life tenant donee
is not technically the owner of the appointive property, and by com-
mon law dogma exercise of the power is merely the event upon
which title shifts from the donor to the appointee, nevertheless, a
general power presently exercisable is tantamount to ownership by
the donee, and so is a general testamentary power in some respects,
but not a special power. 5 ° It is felt that the current frequency of
their use and the parallel between owner-transferor and donee-
transferor in the disposition and control of property warrants their
coverage by this act to prevent wrongful gain by homicidally induced
survivorship at the expense of a donee-victim.
Subsection (a) deals with testate succession by the use of powers.
It makes no distinction between general and special powers and pro-
vides that where the decedent-donee exercises the power by making
an appointment to the slayer-appointee, the slayer shall be deemed
to have predeceased the donee and the property shall pass in accord-
ance with the applicable lapse statute. This state's anti-lapse statute
applies in the absence of a contrary intent, where a testamentary
beneficiary predeceases the testator, is his child or would have
been his heir had he died intestate, and leaves issue who survive the
testator. 5 ' In most cases where the statutory requisites are met as
... LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Girt TAXES 31, 245
(1956); 3 POWELL 392; Horack, Estate Taxation of Powers of Appoint-
'ment, 27 N.C.L. Rlv. 58 (1948).0 3 POWELL 388.
151 See note 62 supra. See also 3 POWELL 399, as to powers and anti-
lapse statutes.
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to the relation of the donee and the slayer and absence of contrary
intent such as a requirement of the appointee's survival of the
testator the effect is to keep the property in the family of the donee
and also to prevent the slayer from benefitting directly by his crime.
The donee-testator not being the owner of the appointive property,
the provision of G.S. § 31A-4(3) that property willed to the slayer
shall pass as if the decedent died intestate thereto would simply
result in the nonexercise of the power and carry it to the takers in
default as named by the donor, unless the doctrine of capture by
the donee might be applied as the result of a lapsed appointment."5 2
Subsection (b) covers two situations: the first is where the slayer
holds property subject to be divested by the decedent's exercise of
a power of revocation or of general appointment; the second covers
the situation where the slayer holds property subject to defeasance
by the exercise of a special power of appointment to a named person
or class of persons. In the first case, the slayer's killing of the
decedent before he exercises either power causes the property
to pass to the decedent's estate, and in the second it passes to the
named person or to the group exclusive of the slayer, as the case
may be.
In the case of the power of revocation or of general appointment
the donee is in effect owner of the property under the general power,
if presently exercisable, and may be under the power of revocation
if by its exercise the property reverts to him.' In both cases the
property passes to the decedent's estate to prevent the slayer's
wrongful retention of it by killing the decedent and thereby prevent-
ing the decedent's divesting him of the property by exercising the
power in favor of himself or of his estate as he could have done
but for his wrongful death. As to the special power, giving it to
the objects of the power exclusive of the slayer carries out the
donor's intent as in the case of a power in trust ;164 and as to the
general power the property passes to the decedent's estate as the
donee could have appointed it but for his wrongful death at the
hands of the slayer.""
§ 31A-11. (a) Insurance and annuity proceeds payable to the
.. See 3 POWELL 399-400.
'8 3 POWELL 389-392.
3 POWELL 402; see Henderson v. Western Carolina Power Co., 200
N.C. 443, 157 S.E. 425 (1931).15 3 POWELL 385-86.
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slayer: (1) As the beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate
of insurance on the life of the decedent, or (2) In any other manner
payable to the slayer by virtue of his surviving the decedent, shall be
paid to the person or persons who would have been entitled thereto
as if the slayer had predeceased the decedent.
(b) If the decedent is beneficiary or assignee of any policy or
certificate of insurance on the life of the slayer, the proceeds shall
be paid to the estate of the decedent upon the death of the slayer, un-
less the policy names some person other than the slayer or his estate as
alternative beneficiary.
(c) Any insurance or annuity company making payment accord-
ing to the terms of its policy or contract shall not be subjected to
additional liability by the terms of this chapter if such payment or
performance is made without notice of circumstances tending to bring
it within the provisions of this chapter.
Legion are the cases which hold that the beneficiary of an in-
surance policy who feloniously murders the insured cannot recover
the proceeds. While various grounds are utilized, probably most
courts so hold on the principle that such a wrongdoer is not per-
mitted to come into court and with bloody hands take the profit of
the crime which insured his survivorship."58 Where the slayer-
beneficiary is not the heir or next of kin it is the great weight of
authority that the proceeds belong to the insured's estate and pass
to his intestate successors or residuary legatees,""7 but even where
the slayer is the heir or next of kin he is usually treated as if he
had predeceased the decedent and the persons next in succession are
held entitled to the proceeds. 5 s If there is a contingent beneficiary
in such cases he is generally held entitled to the proceeds,' 59 but
" New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886);
Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Linson, 245 Ala. 493, 17 So. 2d 761 (1944);
Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816 (1923);
Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910); Smith v. Todd,
155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930) ; De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 60 S.D.
532, 245 N.W. 58 (1932). See generally RESTATEMENT, RE.STITUTION
§ 189 (1937) ; VANcE, INsuRAxcE § 117 (2d ed. 1951) ; Grossman, Liability
and Rights of the Insurer When the Death of the Insured is Caused by the
Beneficiary or an Assignee, 10 B.U.L. REv. 281 (1930).
"" Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Linson, supra note 156.
... Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816
(1923) ; De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 60 S.D. 532, 245 N.W. 58 (1932).
Contra, National Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 38 Ohio App. 454, 176 N.E.
490 (1929).
... E.g., Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931).
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some courts have held the decedent's estate entitled. 6 ' It is gen-
erally held that such a felonious killing does not relieve the in-
surance company of liability' unless the killing was an excepted
risk, the insurance was fraudulently procured, or no person except
the slayer-beneficiary or one claiming under him has an interest in
the policy.' 62 A joint life insurance policy on two people payable
to the survivor is paid, not to the slayer-beneficiary who assures
his survival by killing the decedent, but to the latter's estate ;103 and
the same occurs in some cases where the insured is slayer and the
decedent is beneficiary.'64
There are statutes in about ten states which expressly disqualify
the slayer from recovering proceeds of insurance on the decedent's
life and provide how they shall be paid,' but most of them bar him
indirectly as heir or legatee of the decedent.
The provisions of this section reflect the basic common law
principles of insurance law above set forth. Subsection (a) prevents
a slayer who is a beneficiary, an' assignee or one otherwise entitled
as survivor of insurance or annuity policy proceeds from receiving
them and directs their payment to the persons entitled as if the slayer
predeceased the decedent. This provision is wide as to the per-
sons who are included as policy "beneficiaries" and barred, and
should include joint life policies, and carry the proceeds to the altern-
ative beneficiary if there is one, otherwise to the estate of the insured
if he owned a reversionary interest in the policy. If there had been
a complete assignment of the policy to the slayer, the proceeds should
go to his estate at the expiration of the decedent's life expectancy be-
cause his interest in the policy cannot be legally forfeited for his
crime, and he should not benefit by his wrongful acceleration of
payment.
Subsection (b) provides for the case where the insured is the
1. E.g., Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67
S.E.2d 71 (1951).
... Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816
(1923); Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910).
... E.g., Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., supra note 161; 4 ScOTT § 494.2.
.
6 Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 110 N.J.L. 414, 166 At!.
335 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).16'Parker v. Potter, 200 N.C. 348, 157 S.E. 68 (1931); Union Centra
Life Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth Trust Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 505, 183 Atl. 181 (Ct.
Ch. 1936); RESTATEMENT, RFSTITUTION § 189(2), comment c (1937);
VANCE, op. cit. supra note 156, at § 117.
106 See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfilly Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REv. 715 (1936).
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slayer and the beneficiary or policy assignee is the decedent. By
his crime the slayer has assured his own survival and should not
be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of his victim. The pro-
ceeds are therefore made payable to the decedent's estate unless
there is a named alternative beneficiary other than "the slayer or
his estate." Some cases embody the principle of this statutory solu-
tion but they generally so rule only where the insured does not have
the right to change the beneficiary."6'
Subsection (c) protects the insurance company or another
against added liability under this chapter when payment or its
equivalent in accordance with the policy's terms is made without
notice of facts or circumstances tending to bring such beneficial
payment or performance within the provisions of this chapter. If
the insurance company does have such notice it would probably
resort to interpleader to protect itself.
§ 31A-12. The provisions of this chapter shall not affect the rights
of any person who, before the interests of the slayer have been ad-
judicated, acquires from the slayer for adequate consideration prop-
erty or an interest therein which the slayer would have received except
for the terms of this chapter, provided the same is acquired without
notice of circumstances tending to bring it within the provisions of
this chapter; but all -consideration received by the slayer shall be held
by him in trust for the persons entitled to the property under the
provisions of this chapter, and the slayer shall also be liable both for
any portion of such consideration which he may have dissipated, and
for any difference between the actual value of the property and the
amount of such consideration.
This section protects a bona fide purchaser for adequate con-
sideration and without notice who before adjudication of the ques-
tion, buys property from the slayer which he would have received
except for the provisions of this chapter. Such a purchaser takes
free of these provisions. The slayer is required to hold all pro-
ceeds so received for the persons entitled under this section, and is
liable for both the consideration received and for any difference
between the actual value of the property and the consideration paid
to him.
Since this chapter prevents title passing to the slayer, this section
achieves the anomalous result of permitting one without title to
1. See cases and text cited in note 164 supra.
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convey title. As between the protected innocent purchaser and the
decedent's heirs who are volunteers the result seems desirable. Also,
the land title records would normally show the survivor to be
the sole owner, and therefore title examiners and bona fide pur-
chasers need protection. The same or similar statutory solutions
exist in several other states.OT
ARTICLE 4-GENERAL PROVISIONS
This article consists of four sections, three of which contain
modifying provisions applicable to one or more of the prior sections
of this chapter which are as follows: G.S. § 31A-13 makes the
record of the slayer's trial admissible in evidence in a civil action
concerning property rights under this chapter; G.S. § 31A-14 nega-
tives application of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act1 8 in cases
governed by this act; G.S. § 31A-15 declares affirmatively against
construction of this chapter as penal, and also provides that the
chapter shall govern as to all matters specifically provided for in it,
but negatives its application in all other cases.
§ 31A-13. The record of the judicial proceeding in which the
slayer was determined to be such, pursuant to § 31A-3 of this chapter,
shall be admissible in evidence for or against a claimant of property
in any civil action arising under this chapter.
This section settles the question of admission in evidence of
the record in the proceeding which established the slayer's guilt.
It is admissible for or against the claimant of property in any civil
action arising under this chapter. But the section does not so
provide in case of an alleged slayer's acquittal. This distinction may
be justifiable on the theory that a jury will fail to understand the
difference in burden of proof between criminal and civil proceedings
to the prejudice of the decedent's estate.
In some states this type of statute which prevents a slayer from
acquiring property from or through his victim provides merely
that "the term 'slayer' shall mean any person who wilfully and
unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the life of another." Under
such a statute the court in a civil action involving title to the
16 See Wade, supra note 165, at 750. As to notice, see Exchange Trust
Co. v. Godfrey, 128 Okla. 108, 261 Pac. 197 (1927).18N.C. Gax. STAT. §§ 28-161.1 to -161.7 (1950).
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property must determine for its purposes whether or not the alleged
slayer was guilty of this crime.169
In the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, neither
a conviction nor an acquittal will control civil litigation to determine
ensuing property rights.1' °  By the great weight of authority the
record of a conviction in a criminal proceeding is not admissible in
such a civil action to prove the guilt or innocence of the person tried
because the parties to the two proceedings are not the same and the
rules as to competency of witnesses and weight of testimony are
different. 1 However, there is growing criticism of this general
rule of exclusion and departure from it.'
7 2
The new act takes a different form which should and is intended
to avoid both this problem of evidence and retrial of the question
of guilt in the civil action. In G.S. § 31A-3 it defines the terms
slayer, decedent, and property, and by other sections legally disables
the slayer of the decedent from acquiring or retaining certain prop-
erty rights which accrue as a result of the decedent's death. Slayer
is defined as one who is by a court of competent jurisdiction ad-
judged guilty as a principal or accessory before the fact of the wilful
and unlawful killing of the decedent by one of the following four
methods: (a) upon a plea of not guilty; (b) upon a plea of guilty;
(c) upon a plea of nolo contendere; (d) by a specified civil action
where the one who kills another dies or commits suicide before
trial for the crime.
In a civil action as to the property, a principal fact in issue is
simply whether plaintiff or defendant or the one through whom he
claims title has been so adjudged to be the slayer of the decedent.
Thus in such civil action the record of one's conviction, or a finding
in the civil action under subsection (d), that one was the decedent's
slayer, would be introduced and admissible in evidence, not to prove
guilt, but to establish one's status as slayer as a separate relevant
fact which would of itself bar him from acquiring or retaining the
... United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1950);
Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 151 So. 491 (1933).
"
0 McDuffie v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 160 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
... Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E.
301 (1922) ; 4 ScoTT § 494.4; 4 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 1617a (3d ed. 1940);
Annot., 31 A.L.R. 261 (1924).
""Eagle. Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140
S.E. 314 (1927); 4 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 171.
19621
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
property. 7 3  Thus no other evidence of the crime than the specified
court record would seem necessary, and evidence in the civil action
that one was not in fact guilty of the crime would seem both im-
material and inadmissible.
This type of statute seems preferable by so simplifying the pro-
cedure in the civil action. Where an issue of guilt has been de-
termined in a criminal case with its more extensive procedural
safeguards and greater burden of proof, retrial of the same issue
in a civil action seems wasteful of judicial administration. And the
evidential effect accorded to the civil procedure of subsection (d),
which is so often necessary to forestall the slayer's bounty, seems
reasonable. Perhaps this section is merely confirmatory of existing
common law on the subject, but it does settle the question in advance
as to such proceedings under this chapter.
§ 31A-14. The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, G.S. 28-161.1
through 28-161.7, shall not apply to cases governed by this chapter.
In certain cases where the title to property or its devolution
depends upon priority of death and there is no sufficient evidence
that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the Uni-
form Simultaneous Death Act makes statutory dispositions thereof
which might otherwise conflict with the dispositions made by this
chapter when one of such persons is the slayer of the other. For
example, G.S. § 28-161.3 provides that where two persons who are
joint tenants or tenants by the entirety so die the property shall be
distributed one-half as if one had survived and one-half as if the
other had survived. This is not in accordance with the disposition
made by G.S. §§ 31A-5 and 31A-6 of this chapter when one co-
owner wilfully and unlawfully kills the other-a fact which might
be readily established even though the order of deaths could not be.
§31A-15. This chapter shall not be considered penal in nature,
but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this
State that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong. As
to all acts specifically provided for in this chapter, the rules, remedies,
and procedures herein specified shall be exclusive, and as to all acts
not specifically provided for in this chapter, all rules, remedies, and
procedures, if any, which now exist or hereafter may exist either by
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188
(1934), discussed in Note, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 287 (1935).
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virtue of statute, or by virtue of the inherent powers of any court of'
competent jurisdiction, or otherwise, shall be applicable.
This section negatives the penal nature of this chapter, and.
provides that as to all acts specifically provided for the rules,.
remedies and procedure shall be exclusive, but as to all acts not so,
specifically included all existing rules, remedies and procedures and,
those hereafter created or existing by statute, judicial power or
otherwise shall apply.
There is a doctrine that if legislation undertakes to provide for
the regulation of human conduct in regard to a specific matter or
thing already covered by the common law, and parts of which are-
omitted from the statute, such omissions must be taken generally-
as evidence of the legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the same.1 74
And while a court might not construe this chapter to be all-embracing
and thus to supplant completely the common law on the subject, 175 "
this section affirmatively preserves the common law, substantive and
procedural, as to all acts not explicitly provided for in this chapter.
While this chapter seeks to provide for the usual situations in
which the slayer may benefit from the decedent's death, some cases.
of wrong will inevitably arise which are not so covered but should
be in accordance with the stated policy to prevent one from profiting-
by his own wrong. Thus the fact that this chapter covers only
wilful and unlawful homicide does not necessarily preclude other
wrongful killings from barring property rights by common law,
such as an unintentional killing resulting from reckless disregard for
human life or during the commission of a felony. Possibly an ac-
quitted killer might be so barred in some cases since this chapter is.
silent as to the effect of an acquittal; and the same is true of failure-
to prosecute, except in the one case covered by G.S. § 3 1A-3 (i) (d).
As heretofore stated, certain cases of wrongful death are not
covered by this chapter, for example, by an insane person who could'
not have the requisite intent, but this should not prevent the court
in a civil proceeding as to title to the property from determining
whether the killer was insane at the time of the killing.17 In such
... Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Conn. 491, 95 A.2d 71 (1953); In re Lord &
Polk Chem. Co., 7 Del. Ch. 248, 44 Atl. 775 (Ct. Ch. 1895).
... Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1954); Smith v. Todd, 155-
S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930).
17 Goldsmith v. Pearce, 345 Mich. 146, 75 N.W.2d 810 (1950) ; Andersom
v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956).
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instances the malleable constructive trust concept and other non-
statutory remedies remain available under the terms of this chap-
ter."7
... Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188
(1934); 4 Scorr § 492.4.
